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I propose a dual conceptualization of violent crime. Since violent crime is both violence and crime, theories of aggression and deviance are required to un-
derstand it. I argue that both harm-doing and rule breaking are instrumental behaviors and that a bounded rational choice approach can account for both 
behaviors. However, while some of the causes of harm-doing and deviance (and violent and nonviolent crime) are the same, some are different. Theories of 
crime and deviance cannot explain why one only observes individual and group differences in violent crime and theories of aggression and violence cannot 
explain why one observes differences in all types of crimes. Such theories are “barking up the wrong tree.”
Violence, Crime, and Violent Crime
Richard B. Felson, Department of Sociology, Pennsylvania State University, United States
Violent crime involves both crime and violence. Crime 
involves rule breaking while violence involves intentional 
harm-doing using physical means. !erefore, an under-
standing of violent crime requires an understanding of 
both aggression and deviance. We need to understand why 
people harm others as well as why they break rules. To gain 
a theoretical understanding of individual and group dif-
ferences, we must pay attention to whether individuals and 
groups vary in their violent behavior or in their criminal 
behavior. We should establish what facts require explana-
tion before attempting to explain them.
Stinchcombe (1968) emphasizes the importance of proper 
conceptualization of the dependent variable in his classic 
work on theory construction. He uses delinquency as an 
example, pointing out that di&erent kinds of action that 
concern the police may turn out to have di&erent causes: 
natural variables that create administrative problems are 
not the same variables that have a unique set of causes. 
Sometimes applied researchers formulate this by saying 
that a natural variable “has multiple causes.” From the sci-
enti'c point of view, this means that the applied researcher 
is trying to explain the wrong thing. (41)
Violence and crime are overlapping domains: some acts 
of violence are not criminal or even deviant. For example, 
violence in self-defense, violence by social control agents 
(parents and police), and violence in war are typically 
neither criminal nor deviant. On the other hand, the) and 
illicit drug use are crimes but do not involve violence. In 
addition, di&erent types of crime involve di&erent attitudes 
toward harm. Some o&enders want to harm the victim (e.g., 
most assaults), some do not care (e.g., most robbery, rape, 
and property crimes), and some commit victimless crimes 
(e.g., taking illicit drugs). If we are interested in criminal 
violence, we should be trying to explain why people want to 
harm others or do not mind harming others, as well as why 
they are willing to break the law. Identifying the proper 
outcome or dependent variable is important because it has 
theoretical implications. A theory of aggression is needed 
to explain e&ects that are only observed for violence, while 
a theory of deviance is needed to explain e&ects that are 
observed for all types of criminal behavior.1
1 Determining the proper dependent variable 
is also a problem in the study of non-violent 
crime. It is important to know whether the 
etiologies of drug use and white-collar crime 
are the same as the etiology of other crimes.
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Because criminologists are not typically interested in 
crime as harm-doing, they o)en ignore the extensive social 
psychological literature on aggression.2 !ere are many psy-
chologists in the world and they do a considerable amount 
of high quality research in this area, so this is a large and 
important literature to ignore. In addition, those who study 
violence (from a variety of disciplines) o)en ignore both 
theories of aggression and theories of crime. !ey study 
particular types of violence: youth violence, sexual violence, 
violence against women, child abuse, gang violence, hate 
crimes, workplace violence, homicide, and mass murder. 
As a result, the study of violence has become Balkanized. 
Sometimes those working in one of these areas develop spe-
cial theories to explain the particular type of violence they 
study. For example, feminist theory is o)en used to explain 
violence toward women when the explanations for violence 
against men and women may be similar (Felson 2002).
If our independent variables are only associated with 
particular types of violence, we may need more specialized 
theories. However, one should not assume that a particular 
type of violence has a special etiology. Parsimony is not 
everything, but it is an important value in science. It is, 
therefore, important to examine di&erent types of violence 
and crime in the same study and compare e&ects. !en we 
can determine what it is we are trying to explain and how 
general a theory we need.
In this essay I attempt to clarify the relationship between 
violence and crime. I suggest that some of the causes of 
harm-doing and crime are similar and some are di&er-
ent. One does not need a separate theory to explain them, 
however. I argue that harm-doing as well as rule breaking 
involve instrumental behavior, although the incentives and 
costs are sometimes di&erent. A rational choice perspec-
tive, broadly conceived, can explain both aggression and 
deviance. !is approach does not require an abandonment 
of criminological theories since most of these theories treat 
crime as instrumental behavior.
I begin by de'ning violence and indicating how it relates 
to crime. I then discuss the motivation for violence, and 
relate it to well-known social psychological processes such 
as the pursuit of justice, impression management, and social 
in,uence. I emphasize the distinction between predatory 
and dispute-related crime, suggesting that it is related to the 
o&ender’s attitude toward harm. In a concluding section, I 
discuss the implications of viewing violent crime as distinct 
from other crime and as instrumental behavior.
1. De!nitions
In science it is important to classify events in a manner that 
allows us to understand the causes of those events (Kaplan 
1964). Good concepts allow us to better understand and 
explain events while bad concepts impede the develop-
ment of knowledge. !e way one organizes phenomena into 
descriptive units has important theoretical implications. 
We prefer to classify together behaviors that have com-
mon causes and di&erentiate behaviors that have di&erent 
causes. For example, it seems clear that it is useful to classify 
homicide and suicide separately, since they usually have 
di&erent causes. Suicide is strongly related to depression, 
while homicide is not. Certainly, they both involve killing 
someone, and both may have a few common causes, but it is 
probably not useful to classify them together.
Crime is a violation of law and therefore an act of deviance, 
i.e., a rule-violation. De'ning aggression (and violence) has 
proved to be more problematic. I begin with a discussion of 
the de'nition and then show its relationships to crime and 
deviance.
1.1. Aggression
Aggression is most o)en de'ned as any behavior whose 
intent is to harm another person (e.g., Berkowitz 1962). !e 
actor deliberately does something to the target knowing 
that the target would prefer to avoid it.3 !e de'nition of 
aggression as deliberate harm includes behaviors that are 
intended to harm but are unsuccessful and excludes behav-
2 Criminologists also ignore social psychological the-
ories of conformity, even though they study deviance.
3 Intent has di&erent meanings, but in this context it 
only means that the actor harmed the target on pur-
pose. Motives refer to the reasons why actors inten-
tionally harmed the target, i.e., their goals in doing 
so. Both proximate and distal goals can be involved. 
For example, the robber deliberately harms the vic-
tim in order to gain compliance (the proximate goal) 
for the purpose of getting money (the distal goal).
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iors that involve accidental harm. Unsuccessful attacks have 
similar causes as successful attacks while accidental harms 
do not. Violence is physical aggression, i.e., when people use 
physical methods to harm others. !e harm they produce is 
not necessarily physical, however. It could be a social harm 
or a deprivation of resources (Tedeschi and Felson 1994).
Note that the de'nition of aggression (and violence) re-
quires that we understand the actor’s point of view, not the 
point of view of victims or observers. !e focus on the ac-
tor’s perspective is central to the social psychological study 
of human behavior. For example, if someone thinks they 
have been insulted, but the adversary did not intend the 
insult, the misunderstanding may lead to aggression, but 
the initial act is not aggression. If a rape victim feels power-
less or humiliated that does not imply that the o&ender was 
motivated to produce those outcomes. If a paranoid football 
fan thinks the players are talking about him in the huddle, 
he acts on his de'nition of the situation. It is his interpreta-
tion of reality, however wrong or ridiculous, that a&ects 
his behavior. !at is why mental illness is a causal factor in 
violence (Link and Steuve 1994; Silver, Felson, and VanE-
seltine 2008). We should not apply the “reasonable person” 
standard like they do in the legal system. We should not say 
that the o&ender should have known what he or she was 
doing since most reasonable people would know. Leave that 
type of thinking to judges and juries; scientists should be 
interested in cause, not establishing whether the o&ender is 
to blame. On the other hand, they should be interested in 
the o&ender’s attributions of blame, since those beliefs can 
lead to violent behavior.
1.2. Violence and Deviance
Research shows that most people only label an act of harm-
doing “aggression” when they think it is wrong (e.g., Brown 
and Tedeschi 1976). For them, aggression involves anti-so-
cial behavior that is contrary to the norms of society. While 
they do not label all bad behavior aggressive, there is a ten-
dency to consider all aggressive behavior bad. Actually, it is 
unlikely that they really believe all harm-doing is bad. !ey 
just use di&erent language to describe harm-doing when 
they think it is legitimate. For example, when the judge 
sentences the o&ender to prison, or when parents discipline 
their children, the behavior is described as punishment, not 
aggression. Alternatively, they could say that the judge or 
parent has engaged in legitimate aggression and that the 
“end justi'es the means.” !is explanation is not readily 
accepted as a justi'cation. Better to use the word “punish-
ment” which has a more positive connotation. 
Adversaries are particularly likely to have a di&erent inter-
pretation of events. !ose who engage in aggression and 
violence are o)en self-righteous (Katz 1988). When someone 
harms them, it is aggression; when they harm someone else, 
it is justice. Since their adversaries deserved to be punished 
for their bad behavior, their own attack was legitimate and 
even pro-social, not anti-social or violent. !e adversary’s 
behavior was blameworthy, but their own behavior was not.
If punishment is aggression, or intentional harm-doing, 
then one can say that aggression and violence are o)en a 
response to deviance. When people break rules, others want 
to harm them to deter future rule-breaking and for the 
purpose of obtaining justice. In other words, aggression can 
be a form of social control. Sometimes people use violence 
instead of relying on the police to redress their grievances 
and exact punishment. !ey take the “law into their own 
hands.” !is is sometimes called vigilante justice or self-
help (Black 1983). In sum, aggression is sometimes deviant, 
sometimes a response to deviance, and sometimes both.
Justice requires that the wrong-doer is appropriately 
punished, i.e., that the punishment should “'t the crime.” 
We think punishment is a good thing—an act of justice or 
retribution—and we condemn judges and parents who are 
too lenient.4 Failing to harm someone who deserves to be 
punished is a violation of the rule of retributive justice. !e 
nonaggressive person is criticized for allowing wrongdoers 
to “get away with it.” !us, in some instances, the failure to 
use aggression is considered deviant. 
4 While some people think it is good in the long run 
for the wrongdoer to su&er punishment, that is not 
an essential element. People sometimes do harm 
to ultimately help someone. Acts of aggression in 
the short term can be acts of altruism in the long 
term. For example, parents think that appropriate 
punishment is good for their children’s development.
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An over-reaction or disproportionate response is also per-
ceived as deviant. For example, we might view an insult, but 
not violent retaliation, as an appropriate response to a ver-
bal attack. Many acts of criminal violence are condemned 
because they are over-reactions. Anyone would have been 
angry at the provocation, and prone to use some level of 
aggression, but the o&ender’s response was disproportion-
ate (Toch 1992). Parents who engage in abuse typically do it 
in discipline situations, where a child has misbehaved. !e 
parents engage in punishment that is disproportionate to 
the child’s o&ense; they “go too far.” We sometimes use the 
term “abuse” when we think the punishment is too harsh. 
To some extent the study of criminal violence is the study of 
the inappropriate use of aggression.
!e attitudes we have regarding when it is appropriate 
to use aggression and violence are nuanced and context-
dependent. Many people are ambivalent about aggressive 
responses to misbehavior. !ey sometimes think it is im-
portant to “turn the other cheek” or to only use violence as 
a last resort. !ey may think that violence is wrong, but at 
the same time think people should punish wrongdoing and 
“stand up to bullies.”
Of course, people have di&erent attitudes toward the use 
of violence. Legitimacy is, to some extent, in the eye of the 
beholder. For example, most Americans think spanking is 
a necessary method of childrearing while others think it is 
illegitimate and abusive. It is illegal in some of the Scan-
dinavian countries. However, some social scientists focus 
too much on acts about which people disagree. !ey give a 
few examples of where people di&er in their evaluation of 
speci'c behaviors and then claim deviance is arbitrary. For 
example, Americans tend to disagree about the seriousness 
of drug o&enses, but there is a great deal of consensus about 
most deviant acts, particularly those involving intentional 
harm-doing (Rossi et al. 1974). We almost all agree that 
homicide, assault, robbery, and rape are serious o&enses. 
We almost all view violence against women as more seri-
ous than violence against men (Felson 2002). Even serious 
criminal o&enders agree that the major violent o&enses are 
wrong, leading Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) to argue 
that attitudes have no e&ect on criminal behavior.
In sum, it is important to recognize the similarities between 
legitimate and illegitimate aggression and violence. !e mo-
tives are o)en the same. !e reasons criminals use violence 
are not so di&erent in kind from the motives of parents who 
discipline their children. In both cases, the harm-doer may 
be seeking justice or trying to deter the target from engag-
ing in particular behaviors. However, it is also important to 
recognize the di&erences between legitimate and illegiti-
mate aggression and the role of deviance.
2. A Rational Choice Approach
!e explanations scholars give for aggression and violence 
are o)en di&erent from the explanations they give for other 
human behavior (including deviance). !ey attribute most 
aggression to a special mechanism involving frustration 
or aversive stimuli (Berkowitz 1989; Dollard et al. 1939). 
Aversive stimuli lead the person to experience negative 
a&ect which instigates “reactive” or “expressive aggres-
sion.” !e link between negative a&ect and the desire to 
hurt others is biological.5 It leads people to lash out a)er 
experiencing stress, pain, failure, or su&ering of any sort, 
unless they are inhibited by the costs. When it is too costly 
to attack the person who made them feel bad, they may 
displace their aggression onto innocent third parties. !ose 
who take a frustration aggression approach do not claim 
that all aggression is expressive, however. !ey acknowledge 
that there is instrumental aggression as well, but claim it is 
much less frequent than expressive aggression.
2.1. Violence as Instrumental Behavior
I suggest that all aggression is instrumental behavior, even 
when it involves anger. From this perspective, the motive 
to harm others is related to basic human desires. People 
attempt to in,uence others, since many of our rewards are 
provided by other people. !ey want to be treated fairly 
5 Without the biological connection, expres-
sive aggression is di0cult to explain. Why else 
would exposure to pain and many other aversive 
stimuli lead to a desire to harm others? If the 
mechanism is innate, one might also wonder 
what evolutionary process would produce it.
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and they think those who fail to do so should be punished. 
!ey usually target the person who has o&ended them, not 
innocent third parties. !ey also want the esteem of others 
and to think favorably of themselves, so they retaliate when 
they are attacked to avoid a loss of face. Finally, some people 
engage in risky activities because they enjoy the thrills. Vio-
lence is a dangerous and therefore exciting activity.
Aggression and violence, then, are based on basic social 
psychological processes. People harm others because it gets 
them something they want at not too great a cost. Aggres-
sion can be a method of getting retribution when one has 
a grievance, a method of impressing others, a method of 
getting others to comply, and a form of thrill-seeking. By 
forcing others to comply, the actor can get money, sex, and 
other rewards. We, therefore, do not need a special theory 
to explain it. We do not even need a general theory of ag-
gression; rather, we can use the most widely accepted theory 
of human behavior, one that emphasizes rewards and costs. 
Such an approach is preferable on grounds of parsimony.
Another reason to view aggression as instrumental behav-
ior is the evidence against the major competition: frustra-
tion-aggression approaches. Participants do not respond 
with aggression to aversive stimuli in the laboratory unless 
they blame someone for it (see Tedeschi and Felson 1994 for 
a review). Only certain types of aversive stimuli—perceived 
wrong-doing and intentional attack—lead to anger and 
dispute-related aggression. Pain, illness, and death of loved 
ones, the most aversive stimuli in the human experience, 
do not have this e&ect. Bad news makes people upset but it 
does not usually make them aggressive. A bad mood a)er 
an aversive experience may facilitate an aggressive response 
because it interferes with careful decision-making, but it is 
not an instigator. A strong biological link between aversive 
stimuli and aggression has not been demonstrated.
Treating violence as instrumental behavior is sometimes 
described as taking a rational-choice approach. Rational 
choice theorists use the name reluctantly because of the ex-
cess baggage it carries with it. !ey know that rationality is 
“bounded,” i.e., that behavior re,ects subjective judgments 
about payo&s, and that individuals o)en make careless 
decisions that can have disastrous outcomes. Many aggres-
sive acts are performed impulsively and with great emotion. 
Violent crime is more likely to be committed impulsively 
than nonviolent crime, although both are o)en committed 
on impulse (Felson and Massoglia unpublished). However, 
while violent o&enders sometimes fail to adequately con-
sider costs and the moral aspects of their behavior, they are 
still making decisions and they are still pursuing something 
they value. !e fact that the incentives for violence are 
o)en symbolic —e.g., status, retribution—and the fact that 
people can get very angry when provoked does not negate 
the instrumentality of the behavior.
A rational choice approach is also useful in the analysis of 
collective violence. For example, the current approach to 
understanding riots emphasizes the purposive behavior 
of individuals or small groups within the larger gathering 
(McPhail 1991). Scholars no longer emphasize the irrational-
ity of “mobs” operating out of control and as a group (e.g., 
Le Bon 1895). In most riots only a minority of the partici-
pants engage in property destruction and looting, and an 
even smaller percentage engage in interpersonal violence 
(McPhail 1991). !e motives are similar to the motives for 
individual violence. Participants in protest riots o)en have 
grievances with the government or the police: a common 
precipitating event is some violent action by the police (Tilly 
2003). Participants in communal riots have grievances 
against another group. On the other hand, some partici-
pants in riots have no grievance, but view the decline in 
capable guardianship as an opportunity to loot for pro't, 
or to destroy property for entertainment. !rill-seeking is 
probably the motivation for participants in celebration riots, 
as well as for the large number of people who come to watch 
any civil disorder.
2.2. Deviance as Instrumental Behavior
It is not necessary to switch theories in order to explain 
crime and deviance. Most of the major criminological 
theories treat crime as instrumental behavior. Most focus 
on the cost side of the equation, although each emphasizes 
di&erent costs. Hirschi’s control theory (1969) emphasizes 
the costs produced when people have strong social bonds to 
conventional others. People are less likely to break the law 
when they anticipate it will spoil important relationships or 
cause them to lose their investments in conventional enter-
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prise. Deterrence theory emphasizes costs produced by the 
criminal justice system, while social disorganization theory 
emphasizes the costs produced when a neighborhood has 
high “collective e0cacy” (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 
1997). Finally, the routine activity approach emphasizes 
costs produced by capable guardianship (M. Felson 1998). 
Each of these is posited as a separate theory, but they all 
treat crime as instrumental behavior, so they are compat-
ible. !ere is no reason to rule out any of these costs playing 
some role in criminal behavior, whether it involves violence 
or not.
Gottfredson and Hirschi’s general theory of crime (1990) 
treats crime as instrumental behavior. It is essentially a 
theory of deviance: impulsive people engage in a variety of 
deviant behaviors, some illegal and some not, because of 
their careless decision-making. Because of their low self-
control they fail to consider or adequately assess the costs or 
morality of their behavior. O&enders are still making deci-
sions, however, and pursuing common desires.
Social learning theory is an alternative version of the 
rational choice approach. It treats crime as instrumen-
tal behavior but emphasizes socialization and the role of 
models as a source of information about what behavior is 
likely to provide a good payo& (Akers 1998). It is one of the 
few theories used in criminology that recognizes the social 
psychological literature. Cultural theories and di&erential 
association are derivatives of social learning theory that 
emphasize the learning of attitudes and behavior from one’s 
peers (e.g., Sutherland 1947). Obviously, people do not learn 
in isolation.
Finally, some versions of strain theory imply that o&enders 
rationally turn to crime for money or status when they an-
ticipate that the probability of achieving success using con-
ventional means is too low (e.g., Cohen 1955). On the other 
hand, some versions of strain theory do not treat crime as 
instrumental behavior. For example, according to general 
strain theory, people violate the law in response to any type 
of aversive stimulus (Agnew 1992). Why bad experience 
leads people to misbehave is unclear. !e link appears to be 
based on a frustration-aggression mechanism.
2.3. Predatory vs. Dispute-related Violence and Crime
Behavior has multiple consequences; some consequences 
are goals while others are incidental outcomes. Robbers and 
petty thieves want the victim’s money or property. !ey 
know they are harming the victim, but the victim’s 'nancial 
loss is usually incidental to them. Of course, a consequence 
that is incidental to the o&ender may be quite costly for the 
victim.
!e o&ender’s attitude toward harming the victim is di&er-
ent in predatory and dispute-related crime. In dispute-re-
lated incidents, harm is the o&ender’s proximate goal. !ese 
o&enders have grievances with their victims, they are angry, 
and they want to see their victims su&er. Most homicides 
and assaults stem from disputes.
Harm is incidental to predatory o&enders, and not a goal. 
!ey deliberately harm victims but do not have a particular 
desire to harm them. Rather, they have some other goal in 
mind and they are willing to harm the victim in order to 
achieve it. One might refer to these behaviors as incidental 
rather than judgmental aggression.
Robbery and rape typically involve predatory violence. Rob-
bers and rapists use violence to force the victim to comply 
because compliance will allow them to get something they 
want. For example, compliance is the robber’s proximate 
goal while money is the distal goal. Most robbers are indif-
ferent to the victim’s su&ering. For them, victims are inter-
changeable, although they may prefer some victims over 
others when they think the payo& will be better or the risks 
lower. Robbers and rapists know that they must frighten or 
physically incapacitate the victim in order to carry out their 
crime. !ey deliberately produce harmful outcomes, but 
that is not what motivates most of them.6 !eir goal is usu-
ally to use rather than abuse their victims.
6 !ere is a substantial ethnographic litera-
ture on the rational thinking of predatory 
o&enders (e.g., Wright and Decker 1997).
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!e) and fraud can be said to involve aggression because 
the o&ender deliberately harms the victim.  !e o&ender 
relies on deception or stealth rather than violence. Since 
the harm is incidental to most thieves and swindlers—who 
have no grievance with the victim—these are typically 
predatory o&enses. !ey desire the stolen object but do not 
care whether the victim su&ers. !e o&ender’s beliefs about 
harm can be ambiguous, however. Shopli)ers may deny 
that anyone is harmed when they target large stores. In the 
mind of these o&enders, no–one is really harmed except the 
large corporations that can a&ord the loss. From their point 
of view, they are engaged in a victimless crime. Some of 
them would never steal from an individual, perhaps because 
the harm would be undeniable. Neutralization techniques, 
sometimes called rationalizations or accounts, probably 
have an important impact on deviant behavior (e.g., Sykes 
and Matza 1957).
On the other hand, some acts of robbery, rape, the), and 
fraud do stem from disputes and the o&ender’s goal is to 
harm the victim (Black 1983). Perhaps they have a griev-
ance with the victim and the) or rape is the way they exact 
punishment. People have a variety of ways of harming their 
victims when they are angry at them. For example, Green-
berg (1993) found that employees who thought they were 
underpaid punished their employer through the). !is 
motivation is more likely to be involved when the o&ender 
knows the victim. People are not as likely to have grievances 
with strangers.
Figure 1: The relationship between crime, harm-doing, and violence
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and victimless
crimes
Predatory
violence
Non-violent
predatory
crimes
Dispute-
related
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Negligence
and victimless
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Richard B. Felson. 2004. A  Rational Choice Approach to Violence in Violence: From Theory to Research,  edited by Margaret A. Zahn, Henry H. Brownstein & Shelly L. Jackson.  Newark, NJ: LexisNexis/Anderson.
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Figure 1 depicts the relationship between harm-doing, 
violence, and crime. Crime in which no harm is intended 
includes victimless crimes and accidents resulting from 
criminal negligence. Harming others is not on the mind of 
these o&enders and is irrelevant to their motivation. !ese 
o&enders are engaged in crime (or, in some cases, a civil 
wrong) but they are not engaged in aggression or violence. 
For other crimes—crimes involving aggression—harm 
is intended (or deliberate). !ese crimes are either preda-
tory or dispute-related, depending on whether harm is an 
incidental consequence or deliberately sought. In the case of 
predatory crime perpetrators deliberately harm the victim 
but they do not particularly value harm—they are indi&er-
ent to whether the victim su&ers. In dispute-related crime, 
the o&ender values harm either because they think the 
victim deserves to be punished for wrong-doing or because 
harm implies victory and an enhanced image for them-
selves.
3. Implications
I have conceptualized violence as related to but distinct 
from crime, as instrumental behavior, and as o)en stem-
ming from disputes. !ese characteristics of violence have 
important implications. !e fact that much violence stems 
from interpersonal (and group) con,ict suggests that we 
need to incorporate the social psychological literature on 
con,ict. !e fact that it involves personal confrontation 
with an adversary suggests that we need to consider “adver-
sary e&ects.” Finally, the distinction between violence and 
crime is necessary for an understanding of individual and 
group di&erences. I now discuss each of these issues.
3.1. Violence and Con"ict
Because drivers on the roads are going in di&erent direc-
tions and competing for space we must have lanes and 
intersections, and we must contend with drivers who cross 
our path. We have rules for turn taking, including stop 
signs and tra0c lights, but drivers sometimes act sel'shly 
or make mistakes. When other drivers perceive violations, 
they may punish the o&ender with a well-known nonverbal 
gesture. Sometimes the accused retaliates and, on rare occa-
sions, the incident escalates and becomes violent.
Similarly, in social life people are o)en at cross-purposes. We 
have rules for turn taking and establishing priorities when 
interests diverge, but con,ict is inevitable. !ese disputes 
sometimes lead to violence. Unfortunately, most discussions 
of aggression and violence ignore the central role of inter-
personal con,ict. Con,ict is a ubiquitous aspect of social 
life and an important source of aggression and violence. !e 
most violent people may be cordial and polite until their 
interests di&er from others or they think they have been 
mistreated. !en they have something to 'ght about.
Divergent interests are common in social life, particularly in 
families. Husbands and wives may love each other but they 
have plenty to 'ght about. Husbands and wives o)en argue 
over sex and money (Buss 1989). Violence may also result 
from extra-marital a&airs, divorce settlements, and con-
,icts over child custody. Con,ict is inevitable when people 
have illicit liaisons, or lose interest and pick new partners. 
We should not be surprised that violence sometimes occurs 
in domestic relationships. In fact, when one controls for the 
level of con,ict, violence is much less likely to occur among 
intimate partners than among other people. Individuals are 
generally less likely to use violence during an altercation 
if the antagonist is a family member than if the antagonist 
is a stranger (Felson, Ackerman, and Yeon 2003). People 
apparently have stronger inhibitions about hitting family 
members than hitting strangers, and as a result, domes-
tic violence is infrequent relative to the level of domestic 
con,ict. !e absolute frequency of domestic violence is high 
because family members o)en have con,icts (and because 
they spend so much time together). Yet, the literature on 
intimate partner violence focuses on sexism and largely 
ignores the role of con,ict.
Young siblings have con,icts over tangible goods and the 
division of labor (Felson 1983). For example, they 'ght over 
the use of the family television set and who should perform 
a particular chore. !ese may be realistic con,icts, unre-
lated to jealousy, or sibling rivalry for status or parental 
attention. !e potential for con,ict is high between siblings 
because of competition for resources and unclear owner-
ship of these resources. While property legally belongs to 
parents, siblings o)en have some claims on their clothes 
and other items. In addition, the rules for the division of 
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labor are o)en unclear. !ese ambiguities create potential 
for con,ict between siblings which may help explain why 
children 'ght more frequently with their siblings than they 
'ght with all other children combined (Felson 1983). Sibling 
violence declines when the children get older, in part, be-
cause they are less likely to have divergent interests.
!e inherent con,ict between social control agents and 
their charges creates opportunities for violence. !us, the 
interaction between the police and suspects and other 
citizens creates opportunities for violence (Westley 1970). 
Many violent con,icts in bars are between bartenders and 
patrons, when the bartender refuses to serve patrons who 
are underage or extremely intoxicated (Felson, Baccaglini, 
and Gmelch 1986). Child abuse typically occurs in disciplin-
ary situations when parents have di0culties controlling 
their children (Tedeschi and Felson 1994).7
!e potential for con,ict and violence is greater when re-
sources are scarce (Fischer 1969). Yananomo men of Brazil 
'ght over scarce females (Chagnon 1977) while Mbuti men 
'ght over hunting territories (Turnbull 1965). Drug dealers 
'ght over the drug market and what territory they control. 
Fischer (1969) found in an experiment that the greater the 
scarcity of resources available to bargainers the more they 
used threats to get those resources.
Sometimes targets comply and the violent actor is suc-
cessful, but other times targets retaliate and the con,ict 
escalates. !ose who resist with violence sometimes deter 
further violence, and sometimes encourage it. Violence 
involves an interaction between at least two parties and the 
cooperation of both is required for a peaceful solution. !is 
basic dilemma is the subject of game theory and the basis 
for strategic thinking about war. Nobel Prizes have even 
been awarded for work in this area (i.e., to Robert Aumann, 
!omas Schelling, and Robert Nash). Yet, the literature on 
violent crime ignores the literature on con,ict.
!ird parties play an important role in dispute-related 
violence, serving as mediators, instigators, guardians, and 
audience. Sometimes third parties egg on the adversaries, 
making it di0cult for them to back down without losing 
face. Sometimes third parties act as mediators, allowing 
both sides to back down without losing face (Felson 1978). 
However, the intervention of third parties on behalf of 
weaker adversaries can increase the likelihood of violence. 
For example, sibling 'ghting is more frequent when parents 
intervene on behalf of the younger sibling (Felson and 
Russo 1988). !e younger and usually weaker sibling is more 
willing to 'ght because they have a protective ally.
3.2. Adversary Effects
Violent situations, unlike other criminal events, involve 
personal confrontation with an adversary. People are likely 
to have strong concerns about the reaction of their adver-
saries since the consequences of an attack are potentially 
catastrophic (Tedeschi and Felson 1994). !eir concerns 
are likely to be particularly strong if they live in communi-
ties where guns are prevalent and retaliation is likely. One 
response to this precarious situation is for people to arm 
themselves or to otherwise adopt an aggressive posture. 
Adversary e&ects play a prominent role in Anderson’s 
description of the code of the streets in African-American 
neighborhoods (1999). He argues that many blacks in inner 
city communities adopt an aggressive posture, in part, to 
avoid victimization. Even youth who are not otherwise 
prone to use violence—the “decent kids”—follow the 
code of the streets. Subcultural arguments, on the other 
hand, emphasize the e&ects of third parties (e.g., Cooney 
1998; Wolfgang and Ferracuti 1967). Actors learn attitudes 
favorable to crime from others or comply because they are 
concerned about audience opinion (Felson et al. 1994). In 
the case of violence, however, adversaries may have a greater 
impact than third parties.8
Adversary e&ects are likely to produce contagion, i.e., vio-
lence spreading geographically in a community or rates in-
creasing over time. Violent crime may be more contagious 
than nonviolent crime because it involves adversary e&ects 
as well as the e&ects of third parties. In addition, the ten-
7 People also have con,icts over means rather than 
ends. Parents may agree that a child’s behavior 
should be changed, but disagree about how to 
correct it. Con,icts that are based on incompatible 
goals are usually more di0cult to resolve than those 
based on incompatible means (Deutsch 1969). 
8 Adversary e&ects are likely to be important 
in any type of competitive relationship.
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dency for individuals to arm themselves with guns may lead 
to an “arms race.” !us, Gri0ths and Chavez (2004) 'nd a 
di&usion of gun homicides from the most violent neighbor-
hoods to adjacent neighborhoods in Chicago. !is di&usion 
was not observed for homicides that involved other weap-
ons or no weapon. An arms race may have developed in 
African-American neighborhoods where individuals carry 
guns to protect themselves from others who are armed 
(Blumstein 1995; Deane, Armstrong, and Felson 2005).
3.3. Explaining Individual Differences
!e situations that lead to violent crime are o)en di&erent 
from the situations that lead to nonviolent crime and devi-
ance. For example, verbal disputes and grievances are much 
more likely to precipitate violent crime. !e individual dif-
ferences that predict violent and nonviolent crime may also 
be di&erent. If harm-doing is more relevant to violent crime 
than other crime, then the o&enders who commit violent 
and nonviolent crime are likely to be somewhat di&erent.
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990; Hirschi & Gottfredson, 
1993) claim that most o&enders commit a variety of o&enses; 
they do not specialize. !ey cite studies of arrest histories 
showing that the probability that violent o&enders will be 
arrested for another violent crime is not much higher than 
the probability that they will be arrested for non-violent 
crimes (e.g., Blumstein and Cohen 1979; Kempf 1987). !ey 
also point out that o&enders tend to engage in a variety 
of noncriminal forms of deviant behavior, such as sexual 
promiscuity, smoking, heavy drinking, excessive gambling, 
and fast driving, and that they perform poorly in school 
and at work. !e evidence on the versatility of o&enders 
suggests that some individual characteristics are common 
to all deviant behavior, whether it involves deliberate harm 
or not, and whether it is illegal or not. !ey claim that the 
common element is low self-control. O&enders believe that 
their behaviors are wrong, but do not act on their beliefs, 
because of their impulsivity. O&enders share conventional 
values, but behave hypocritically because they are careless 
decision makers.
Gottfredson and Hirschi made an important contribution, 
but they exaggerate. O&enders do specialize to some extent. 
For instance, Osgood, Johnston, O’Malley and Bachman 
(1988) found that while half of the stable and reliable vari-
ance in a variety of deviant behaviors was shared variance, 
half was not. More recently, Deane, Armstrong, and Felson 
(2005) 'nd strong evidence for o&ense specialization among 
adolescents. !ey show that violent o&enders are much 
more likely to engage in additional violent o&enses, while 
nonviolent o&enders are much more likely to engage in 
additional nonviolent o&enses. Clearly, the versatility cup is 
half empty and half full. !ere is enough versatility to sug-
gest that a general theory of deviance such as Gottfredson 
and Hirschi’s helps us understand criminal violence. !ere 
is enough specialization to suggest that there is a need for 
explanations of individual di&erences in violence, indepen-
dent of the tendency to engage in deviance.
!e versatility argument also ignores what might be the 
strongest pattern of crime: most o&enders are limited in 
what crimes they are willing to commit. While those who 
commit more serious o&enses usually also commit less seri-
ous crimes, the reverse is not true. !at is why minor crimes 
occur much more frequently than serious crimes. Violent 
crimes tend to be more serious than nonviolent crimes. 
!us those who commit violent crime tend to commit non-
violent crime but those o&enders who commit nonviolent 
crime o)en do not commit violent crime. Some o&enders 
may use illegal drugs but would prefer not to harm others. 
Many petty thieves will not commit robbery and serious 
assault. Most o&enders are inhibited, at least to some extent, 
in the crimes they are willing to commit. !ey may take a 
“cafeteria style” approach to crime, but they are not putting 
everything on their plate.
Clearly, some of the individual characteristics that produce 
violence and other crime are similar and some are di&erent. 
As suggested by Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), low self-
control can help explain the behavior of versatile o&enders 
who engage in a variety of deviant behaviors. However, 
self-control probably plays a greater role in violent o&enses 
since they are more likely to be committed on impulse 
(Felson and Massoglia unpublished). In addition, individual 
di&erences in thrill seeking and the enjoyment of risk o&er 
an alternative explanation of versatile o&ending. From this 
perspective, individuals view risk itself as a value rather 
than as a re,ection of potential costs. !ey seek it rather 
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than avoid it. Versatility is not necessarily due to low self-
control or careless thinking.
Research suggests that individual di&erences in sensation 
seeking re,ect, at least in part, biological di&erences (Raine, 
Venables, and Mendick 1997). People who engage in antiso-
cial behavior tend to be physiologically under-aroused, as 
indicated by lower resting heart rate levels. !ese persons 
may seek out exciting activities to compensate for their 
physiological under-arousal and bring some physiological 
balance to their system. Resting heart rates have also been 
shown to be lower for violent o&enders than nonviolent 
o&enders (e.g., Farrington 1987), suggesting that thrill seek-
ing may be a more important motive for violence than for 
other criminal behavior—violence is more exciting. It may 
also be that fear is more likely to inhibit violent crime than 
nonviolent crime because of the danger resulting from the 
confrontation with the victim.
Any characteristic that makes a person more willing to 
engage in deviance should lead to criminal behavior gener-
ally, not just violations involving harm-doing. For example, 
alcohol intoxication is most likely to result in violent crime 
but it also apparently leads to vandalism, car the), and 
gra0ti writing (Felson, Teasdale, and Burch'eld 2008). 
Testosterone and pubertal development are associated with 
a variety of crimes, not just violence (Booth and Osgood 
1993; Felson and Haynie 2002). To understand these e&ects, 
we need to know why testosterone and puberty lead males 
to engage in deviant behavior.
On the other hand, it is likely that the tendency to de-
liberately harm others has some distinctive causes. Any 
characteristic that increases a person’s desire or indi&er-
ence to harming others is likely to lead to crimes involving 
deliberate harm but not necessarily to victimless crimes or 
crimes of negligence. For example, a hostility bias is likely 
to be related to dispute-related violence (and other dispute-
related crime). Someone with a hostility bias is more 
likely to interpret the behavior of others as aggressive and 
retaliate (Dodge and Somberg 1987). A hostility bias may 
help explain why mental illness has a stronger relationship 
to violence than to other crime (Silver, Felson, and VanE-
seltine 2008). Some mentally ill people have paranoid beliefs 
and these beliefs have been shown to be related to violence 
(Link et al. 1999; Link and Stueve 1994). In addition, people 
who are empathic—who “feel the pain” of others—may 
be less likely to harm others (e.g., Mehrabian 1997). Fi-
nally, people who are more punitive should be more likely 
to engage in dispute-related crime when they think they 
have been mistreated (Markowitz and Felson 1998). While 
everyone thinks wrong-doers should be punished, some are 
more punitive than others. On the other hand, people who 
are tolerant and empathic may take drugs and drink and 
drive, but they will not intentionally harm others. !ey may 
shopli), thinking there is no victim, but they will not steal 
from individuals. !ey will be limited o&enders.
Criminal behavior involving harm-doing (but not other 
deviant behavior) should be negatively related to altruistic 
behavior (Cochran and Chamlin 2006). !ese crimes are 
more likely to involve sel'shness than crimes in which no 
one is harmed. It would be interesting to know whether 
those who engage in crimes involving harm are less likely 
to treat their friends well: Is there “honor among thieves?” 
Perhaps one should only expect this relationship for altruis-
tic behavior in which there is no external reward.
!e relationship between individual di&erence factors 
and violence is complicated because of adversary e&ects. 
Physical strength, 'ghting skills, and favorable attitudes 
toward violence may increase the tendency to engage in 
violence but they may deter potential adversaries. Powerful 
people may not 'nd it necessary to engage in overt violence 
because others fear them. In addition, one does not need 
physical strength to be successful when one has a 'rearm. 
Felson (1996) found that individuals were more likely to 
engage in unarmed violence toward people who were physi-
cally weaker than them, but that this relationship did not 
hold for armed violence.
Individual di&erences are sometimes attributed to model-
ing e&ects. Scholars interested in social learning theory, 
however, rarely consider exactly what types of behavior 
children model. !e assumption has been that children 
imitate the violent behavior of others. However, evidence 
shows that children exposed to media violence in 'eld 
experiments engage in anti-social behavior generally, not 
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just violent behavior (e.g., Hearold 1986). !e fact that view-
ing the violent 'lm has broader e&ects suggests that the 
e&ect does not re,ect the modeling of violence speci'cally. 
Perhaps the pattern is produced by sponsor e&ects. When 
adults sponsor violent 'lms some children may think that 
they are in a permissive environment and that misbehavior 
generally is more likely to be tolerated.
!e evidence is mixed as to whether the intergenerational 
transmission of violence is due to the modeling of parental 
violence or whether children who have been mistreated in 
any way are more likely to engage in a variety of anti-social 
behaviors. Widom (1989) found that children who had been 
physically abused were as adults just as likely to commit 
nonviolent o&ense as violent o&enses. In addition, physi-
cal abuse had no greater e&ect than parental neglect on the 
likelihood that the child would commit violent o&enses as 
an adult. Perhaps these outcomes are due to the e&ects of 
poor attachment or weak social bonds on deviant behavior 
(e.g., Hirschi 1969). On the other hand, a study of prison 
inmates found special links between physical abuse and vio-
lent o&enses and between sexual abuse and sexual o&enses 
(Felson and Lane, 2008). !is research suggested that the 
inmates did speci'cally model violent and sexual behavior. 
Further research examining multiple forms of mistreatment 
and multiple outcomes is needed before we can determine 
whether intergenerational e&ects are due to the modeling of 
speci'c behaviors or some other mechanism.
3.4. Explaining Race, Regional, and Class Differences
Research on race di&erences in crime is typically based on 
measures of criminal violence. !is strategy is reasonable if 
violent behavior is viewed as an indicator of crime or seri-
ous crime. However, in the United States we observe race 
di&erences primarily in violent crime, not crime generally. 
For example, analyses of Add Health data reveal race di&er-
ences in violent behavior but not nonviolent delinquency, 
when socioeconomic status and other variables are con-
trolled (Felson, Deane, and Armstrong 2008).
Social disorganization theory and other theories of crime 
and deviance cannot explain this pattern. How can a neigh-
borhood’s level of social disorganization explain race dif-
ferences when the race di&erence primarily involves violent 
crime? Socially disorganized neighborhoods should experi-
ence more property and drug crime as well. !e theory may 
explain neighborhood variation in crime rates but it cannot 
explain why we observe race di&erences in violence, but not 
crime and deviance generally.
Perhaps one could make an argument that violent crime 
tends to be more serious and, for some reason, disorganized 
neighborhoods only produce serious crime. However, the 
Add Health data suggests that race is not related to minor 
or serious property and drug crimes. A theory of violence is 
therefore required to explain racial patterns. Scholars who 
use criminological theories are trying to explain the wrong 
phenomenon.
Evidence suggests that race is most strongly related to 
armed violence among adolescents (Felson, Deane, and 
Armstrong 2008). Evidence from adult victimization sur-
veys show that blacks are much more likely to be victims 
of armed assault but slightly less likely to be victims of 
unarmed assault (Felson and Pare 2007). !ese patterns 
suggest that because of adversary e&ects, violence in Afri-
can-American communities is more likely to involve guns, 
but that the presence of guns inhibits 'st 'ghts. Fighting 
without weapons becomes too dangerous when adversaries 
are likely to be armed with guns. Serious stu& drives out 
minor stu&. As a result, in the most violent communities, 
violence may be more serious but it is not necessarily more 
frequent.
!is adversary e&ect may help explain why southern whites 
have higher rates of gun homicides and assaults than north-
ern whites, but not homicides and assaults committed with-
out 'rearms (Felson and Pare 2007). !is pattern cannot be 
explained by an honor culture in the South (e.g., Cohen et 
al. 1996). Perhaps the South does have an honor culture—
there is supportive evidence—but a suppressor e&ect is 
operating. It may be that the presence of guns discourages 
knife and 'st 'ghts, because they are too dangerous when 
adversaries are likely to have guns.
Finally, evidence suggests that socioeconomic status is re-
lated to violence but not other types of crime and deviance. 
Felson, Deane, and Armstrong (2008) found that adoles-
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cents from lower status families are more likely to engage in 
most forms of violent crime but no more likely to engage in 
drug or property crime. In fact, adolescents with educated 
parents are more likely to engage in drug-related and minor 
property o&enses. Socioeconomic status of youth, like race, 
is most strongly associated with armed violence. !eories 
of violence, not crime and deviance, are required to explain 
this pattern.
3.5. Explaining High Homicide Rates in the U.S. 
Sometimes criminologists develop a theory to explain 
group di&erences in crime when di&erences are only 
observed for homicide. For example, the United States has 
a much higher homicide rates than European countries. 
However, homicide is a relatively rare phenomenon and 
high homicide rates do not necessarily re,ect high rates of 
violence or crime. In fact, the United States does not have 
higher rates of assault or non-violent crime than European 
countries, according to the International Crime Victim-
ization Survey. !us, Zimring and Hawkins entitle their 
book about violence in the United States: “Crime is Not the 
Problem” (1997).
Since the United States does not have higher rates of violent 
or non-violent crime, neither theories of violence nor crime 
provide adequate explanations. For example, di&erences in 
income inequality or institutional anomie cannot explain 
this pattern (e.g., Messner and Rosenfeld 2002). !ey 
would both predict national di&erences in property crime 
rates or in crime rates generally. One could argue that we 
only observe e&ects for homicide because of greater error 
in measuring other crimes, but victimization surveys are 
thought to provide adequate measurement.
More re'ned analyses of the dependent variable suggest 
that our tendency in the United States to carry handguns 
is critical in explaining why we have higher homicide rates 
than European countries. We have a much higher rate of 
gun homicides than European countries. However, we also 
have a somewhat higher rate of non-gun homicides (Zim-
ring and Hawkins 1997). !erefore it would appear that the 
prevalence of guns cannot fully explain the di&erence. I 
suspect that guns and “adversary e&ects” help explain the 
pattern. Because of our pistol packing, American o&end-
ers encounter more dangerous adversaries, and tactical 
concerns sometimes lead them to have lethal intent. !ey 
desire to kill their adversaries during assaults not just injure 
them. When adversaries may be armed, better “'nish ‘em 
o&.” !us, research suggests that, during assaults, o&enders 
are more likely to kill adversaries from groups that pose a 
greater threat to them (Felson and Messner 1996).
4. Conclusion
I have suggested that we need a dual conceptualization of 
violent crime. In studying individual and group di&erences, 
it is important to understand that violent crime involves 
both aggression and deviance. We need to understand why 
people deliberately harm others as well as why they violate 
the law. We cannot rely upon theories of crime to explain 
why variables predict violent crime when those variables do 
not predict other crime, and we cannot rely upon theories 
of aggression and violence to explain correlates of criminal 
behavior generally.
We do not need di&erent theories to explain violence and 
deviance if we view both types of behavior as instrumental. 
A special frustration-aggression mechanism is not neces-
sary to explain why people engage in violence in response 
to provocations. I have argued that a general theory, based 
loosely on bounded rational choice, is su0cient. !e basic 
idea is that it is important to consider incentives and costs 
when studying aggression or deviance. !e same principles 
apply to collective violence and the violence of authori-
ties. However, certain types of violence have some special 
causes. For example, group processes are more important 
for collective violence.
While some of the causes of violence and other crime are 
similar, some are di&erent. !e versatility of many o&end-
ers implies that common causes, such as low self-control 
and thrill-seeking, are important. However, the reluctance 
of some o&enders to commit violent crimes implies that 
inhibitions about harming others or using physical violence 
are also important. Some people will only commit deviant 
acts that do not involve harm-doing. 
Harm-doing does have some distinctive characteristics and 
causes. It o)en stems from con,ict and it usually involves 
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personal confrontation. Impulsiveness and alcohol intoxica-
tion play a more important role in violence than in other 
crime. Adversaries and third parties also have important 
e&ects on violent crime. Because of adversaries, violence 
and other harm-doing is more likely than deviance to be 
physically dangerous, and more likely to be contagious. 
However, that contagion is moderated by the fact that seri-
ous violence can drive out less serious acts of aggression 
and violence. In addition, because of the social interac-
tion process involved in disputes, the outcomes are more 
unpredictable. Finally, sometimes the motives for violence 
and deviance are similar and sometimes the motives are 
di&erent. Harm-doing o)en involves an attempt to produce 
compliance and gain retribution, whereas deviance does 
not involve these motives. Harm-doing is more likely than 
deviance to be motivated by thrill seeking and the desire for 
a favorable identity.
I have suggested that the distinction between predatory and 
dispute-related aggression is important. In predatory ag-
gression, o&enders intentionally harm their victim but that 
is not their goal. !ey want to force compliance, promote 
an identity, or have some fun at the victim’s expense. In 
dispute-related aggression, the proximate goal of o&enders 
is to harm, but their motives are deterrence, retribution, 
and saving face. It is not clear whether there are individual 
di&erences between o&enders who desire harm and those 
who tolerate harm.
In discussing group di&erences it is important to distin-
guish between harm-doing and deviance. In our theoretical 
explanations, we must be cognizant of the fact that race 
and socioeconomic status are primarily related to violent 
crime but not other crime. We cannot use theories of crime, 
such as social disorganization or control theory, to explain 
these e&ects. Neither can theories of crime explain why 
the United States has higher homicide rates than European 
countries when we do not observe this pattern for other 
crimes. We must develop a theoretical explanation that 
acknowledges the role of guns and lethal intent. !ose of 
us who study violence must make sure that we understand 
what it is we are attempting to explain.
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